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Abstract 
While transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the capacity to foster 
economic well-being, development, technological improvement and wealth, trade and 
investment agreements often lead to policies and governmental measures with a negative 
impact on the full enjoyment of human rights. In 2014, the United Nations Human Rights 
Council decided to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, 
whose mandate is to elaborate a binding instrument of international law. The paper offers 
a discussion of the progress achieved on the topic so far by focusing on the key 
challenges: the added value of a specific treaty, personal scope, material scope, the State 
duty to protect human rights, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, the 
need for greater access to remedy for victims of business-related abuses, etc. 
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Introduction 
The initial approach that corporations were not treated as subjects of international law has 
changed in the last few decades, giving way to the recognition that business organizations 
might have rights and obligations under international law, most notably in relation to 
foreign investments, human rights accountability and environmental liability rules 
(Muchlinski, 2014). 
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 Businesses have profound impact on human rights. On the one hand, transnational 
corporations (TNCs) generate employment and educational opportunities and revive 
living conditions in communities with investment and technologies (Palmer, 2016: 77). 
Long-term investments of TNCs could contribute to poverty alleviation and development. 
Yet, the activities of corporations in local communities can result in violations of human 
rights, including “the dispossession of peasants through land grabs by governments and 
agribusiness; environmental damage by mines; access to medicines for the poor in the 
face of some pharmaceutical giants’ drive to assert their universal patents; living wage 
and safe working conditions in apparel supply chains; collusion of tech companies with 
repressive governments to censor the web; and tax evasion and avoidance by international 
companies” (Bloomer, 2014: 118). 
 Whereas in developed countries legislation and the judicial system provides 
effective guarantees against abuses, these are often non-existent in developing States, 
where corruption, weak enforcement and the inability and/or lack of willingness of States 
to confront the TCNs’ power represent an obstacle to remedy human rights abuses of 
corporations (Palmer, 2016: 77; Teitelbaum, 2010: 3). Governments are interested in 
retaining TNCs in their territories and this “race to the bottom” is favourable to countries 
with relatively low level of human rights protection (Zhao, 2015: 48). 
 The scope of this paper does not allow to go into details as regards the origins of 
the idea of corporate responsibility with respect to human rights, and the various phases 
of developing the business and human rights treaty. Suffice it here to say that, at the 
international level, heightened social awareness of businesses’ impact on human rights 
has resulted in the adoption of various soft law instruments, inter alia, the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011), the ILO Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (2006), supplemented by the 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998), and the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011). Initiatives to promote 
corporate respect for human rights have led to the placement of business and human rights 
(B&HR) on the UN agenda, resulting in the adoption of the first version, the so-called 
Zero Draft of the envisaged B&HR treaty. New developments such as the Zero Draft 
demonstrate how new directions in the international relations, trade and infrastructure 
connections of States result in changes in States’ and TNCs’ approach to human rights 
(Békési, 2010). 
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 The objective of this paper is to provide a brief account of this draft. It argues that 
while the draft represents an important step in the identification and clarifications of 
standards of corporate responsibility, and accountability for TNCs with respect to human 
rights, it is flawed by conceptual vagueness, as well as the weak implementation system 
envisaged by it. 
 
The 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
In 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights, predecessor to the Human Rights 
Council, established a mandate for a Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(SR) “on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises”. In its report of 2008, the SR presented a conceptual and policy framework, 
comprising three core principles: the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by 
third parties, including business; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and 
the need for more effective access to remedies (UN HRC, 2008). Based on this 
framework, the SR developed the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
which was unanimously endorsed by the Human Rights Council in June 2011. 
 The Guiding Principles consist of three pillars. The State duty to protect is a 
standard of conduct prescribing that States must protect against human rights abuse within 
their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. States 
may breach their international human rights law obligations where corporate abuse of 
human rights can be attributed to them, or where they fail to take appropriate steps 
towards the prevention of such abuse. The principles relating to corporate responsibility 
to respect human rights stipulate that TNCs “should avoid infringing on the human rights 
of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.” 
Corporations should develop policy commitments, exercise “human rights due 
diligence,” and provide for or cooperate in remediation processes. The third pillar 
addresses the need for greater access to remedy for victims of business-related abuse. 
 Admittedly, the Guiding Principles do not aim at the creation of new international 
obligations. Instead, the objective was to elaborate the implications of existing standards, 
to integrate them in a single comprehensive framework, to identify the weaknesses of the 
current regime and the possibilities for enforcement (UN Guiding Principles, 2011: 
Introduction, para. 14). Nevertheless, the criticism regarding the non-binding nature of 
the Principles and their overall effectiveness in securing protection to individuals and 
communities against corporate-related human rights harm (Thielbörger, 2017: 46) led to 
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the creation of a UN working group with the task to draft a legally binding instrument. 
Quite interestingly, the Special Representative himself did not support the idea of 
adopting an overarching “business and human rights treaty”. The SR argued that the issue 
“includes complex clusters of different bodies of national and international law” such as 
human rights law, labour law, anti-discrimination law, humanitarian law, investment law, 
trade law, consumer protection law, as well as corporate law and securities regulation. 
Thus, attempt to aggregate them into a general B&HR treaty seems unfeasible (Ruggie, 
2014). 
 
Towards a normative framework: a new B&HR treaty 
In 2014 the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 26/9 establishing an open-ended 
intergovernmental working group (IGWG) with a mandate to elaborate a binding 
instrument of international law to regulate, in international human rights law, the 
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.  
 So far, the working group has had three sessions, in 2015, 2016 and 2017, with 
the fourth to be held in October 2018. In July 2018, Ecuador, on behalf of the 
Chairmanship of the IGWG, released the Draft UN Treaty on Business and Human 
Rights, also called Zero Draft, the text that will be discussed during the fourth round of 
negotiations on the treaty. On 4 September 2018, this was supplemented by a Zero Draft 
Optional Protocol. The major provisions of the treaty are as follows. 
 
Scope, jurisdiction and remedies 
The Treaty applies “to human rights violations in the context of any business activities of 
a transnational character” (Art. 3). While seemingly broad, the meaning of the terms is 
not quite clear. Firstly, it does not cover national companies despite the fact that human 
rights might be abused by transnational as well national companies. The exclusion of the 
latter seriously narrows the scope of the draft. Second, the Zero Draft is restricted to 
profit-making corporations, and thus it does not cover State-owned enterprises, which, in 
many cases, enjoy favourable legislative and factual environment, and operate with 
impunity. Such enterprises can be established e.g. to advance governments’ geopolitical 
interests abroad, for which the enterprise may be subsidized, but since they are not “for 
profit”, they escape the scope of the Zero Draft (UN HRC, 2016a: paras. 15 and 16; 
Ruggie, 2018). 
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 In Art. 3(2), the Zero Draft provides that it covers all international human rights 
and those rights recognized under domestic law. This open-ended formulation fails to 
specify whether it refers to all treaties and customary international law covering human 
rights, or only to those which are binding on the future States Parties to the proposed 
B&HR convention. As far as the reference to domestic law is concerned, it is not clear 
how possible tensions and contradictions between international and national standards 
can be settled. 
 Regrettably, the new text does not directly regulate business activities in the area 
of human rights. Traditionally, “the State has been seen as the primary duty bearer, held 
responsible for realising the human rights of their citizens as well as protecting their rights 
from violation.” (Bloomer, 2014: 116) Thus, human rights treaties create obligations for 
States only. The Zero Draft is similar in this regard: whereas the Preamble provides that 
“all business enterprises … shall respect all human rights”, later it talks about the primary 
responsibility of States to promote, respect, protect and fulfil human rights, and makes no 
further reference to corporate human rights obligations under international law. 
 Jurisdiction with respect to human rights abuses is vested either with the host State 
(where the abuse occurred), or with the home State (where the corporation is domiciled) 
(Art. 5). The obligation of a State to control the conduct of non-State actors where such 
conduct might lead to human rights violations outside its territory is a contentious issue, 
not addressed by the Zero Draft. During the drafting procedure, while certain members 
of the IGWG supported the idea of extraterritorial jurisdiction, others argued that “it could 
only be invoked exceptionally, duly justified by a legitimate interest and when a real and 
substantial link existed between a forum and the parties and claims concerned.” (UN 
HRC, 2018: para. 107) 
 Since there are various legal, procedural and practical barriers preventing access 
to remedy at the national level, the Zero Draft pays special attention to the issue of 
effective access to justice and reparation to those who allege a harm, and legal 
accountability of transnational corporations. Forms of reparation include restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition. Victims of 
abuses often face difficulties in obtaining justice due to lack of sufficient means, thus Art. 
8(5) stipulates that “[i]n no case shall victims be required to reimburse any legal expenses 
of the other party to the claim”. This provision is, however, controversial: while it secures 
access to justice for those unable to afford legal representation and access to the court 
system, it may be seen as an incentive to frivolous litigation. In addition, Art. 8(7) 
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provides for the establishment of an International Fund for Victims to provide legal and 
financial aid to victims. 
 
Prevention and legal liability 
States must ensure “in their domestic legislation that all persons with business activities 
of transnational character” undertake due diligence obligations throughout their business 
activities. This human rights due diligence includes, inter alia, preventing human rights 
violations, undertaking environmental and human rights impact assessments, and 
carrying out meaningful consultations with affected groups and relevant stakeholders. An 
important element of the treaty is that it imposes the duty on States to secure compliance 
with these obligations, and provides for liability and compensation for failure to respect 
due diligence obligations. 
 Article 10 stipulates States’ duties to hold perpetrators liable for human rights 
violations in the context of transnational business activities through their domestic law. 
Such liability is subject to both criminal and non-criminal sanctions. 
 Art. 10(6) imposes civil liability on companies in connection with the actions of 
their subsidiaries and business partners as well, depending on factors of control, 
foreseeable risk, and “strong and direct connection” between the company’s conduct and 
the wrong. Admittedly, a key issue is the parent-subsidiary company relationship, i.e. to 
what extent, if at all, the parent company may be held liable for the wrongs committed by 
its subsidiaries. The problem is that “[t]oday’s mega-corporations with massive legal 
teams can carefully guard against liability by establishing subsidiaries and maintaining 
distinct corporate identities” (Dearborn, 2009: 208). A solution could be to rely on the 
concept of enterprise liability which is based on the assumption that the parent company 
and its subsidiaries are part of a unified joint venture and thus should be held jointly liable. 
Enterprise theory views the corporate group as a singular unit, rather than viewing each 
subsidiary or affiliated corporation as a separate legal entity (Dearborn, 2009: 210). The 
practical rationale behind an eventual piercing of the corporate veil is that “the parent 
corporation, while perhaps not in direct control of the events that lead to massive harm, 
may be in a better position to prevent these catastrophes before they occur through 
oversight, protections, and allocation of capital resources” (Dearborn, 2009: 205). 
However, corporations and legal practitioners are reluctant to depart from the doctrine of 
separation of legal entities. 
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 The provisions on criminal liability are formulated in a loose fashion. First, only 
criminal conduct that occurs in more than one jurisdiction may be punishable. Second, 
the draft establishes criminal liability for criminal offences under international law as well 
as national law, thus it is not clear what happens if the two are divergent. Finally, human 
rights abuses are sanctioned only when committed by “persons with business activities of 
a transnational character”. 
 
Implementation and enforcement 
States must take legislative and administrative measures to ensure the effective 
implementation of the draft treaty and accord special attention to business activities in 
conflict-affected areas and to vulnerable groups, including women, children, persons with 
disabilities, indigenous peoples, migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons 
(Arts. 9 and 15). Statute of limitations shall not apply to violations of international human 
rights law which constitute crimes under international law, while domestic statutes of 
limitations should not be unduly restrictive (Art. 6). 
 One of the major weakness of the draft is its international institutional 
arrangements. The draft provides for a traditional treaty-monitoring body, a Committee 
composed of a limited number of experts whose competence will be limited to the 
supervision of State reports. This restriction, while heavily criticised in relation to the 
other universal human rights conventions (Crawford, 2000; Bristol Conference, 2009; 
Komanovics, 2014), is even more regrettable in the case of corporate abuses. The lack of 
expertise, characteristic of the Committee members of the existing treaty bodies, could 
represent a major problem in the case of the B&HR treaty, which relates to an inherently 
complex and multidisciplinary issue. This, coupled with political bias, is likely to reduce 
the efficiency of the supervision process (Yanes, 2018). 
 The draft Optional Protocol provides for a National Implementation Mechanism, 
vested with a competence to conduct reviews on the implementation of due diligence 
obligations upon request by victims, natural or legal persons conducting business 
activities of a transnational character, or ex officio. On an optional basis, States Parties 
may recognize the competence of National Implementation Mechanisms to receive and 
consider complaints of human rights violations by victims or a group of victims, their 
representatives or other interested parties, with a view to reaching an amicable settlement 
of the matter. In addition, following the precedent set by previous human rights treaties, 
the OP vests the Committee established by the draft treaty with the power to receive and 
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consider communications from or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, as 
well as to make a confidential inquiry. 
 
Assessment 
As the Guiding Principles so far have not been successful in significantly changing States’ 
practices, the B&HR treaty can be regarded as a significant step towards ending the 
impunity for corporate-related human rights abuses. By addressing the existing 
asymmetry between the rights and obligations of businesses, it would be an important 
addition to the nine core human rights treaties. Its legally binding character, its emphasis 
on prevention, its ambitious scope and scale represent a major step towards closing the 
gaps on human rights impacts of transnational operations. 
 Yet, the Zero Draft is not without flaws. Thus, the treaty does not impose legally 
enforceable human rights obligations on companies, it has a weak implementation system 
largely relying on self-reporting, and it fails to protect human rights defenders from 
persecution by both States and businesses. Since many of the gaps in access to remedy 
are filled by them, human rights defenders are frequently stigmatized, harassed or even 
persecuted. Thus, the treaty should provide for the States’ obligation to protect human 
rights defenders. Furthermore, the draft treaty pays scant attention to the heightened risks 
of violations of human rights women face within the context of business activities. The 
draft should use stronger language to prevent gender-based discrimination and provide 
for special measures to address gender-specific risks. During the drafting process it was 
submitted that the treaty should mandate Gender Impact Assessments of planned and 
existing operations, gender-sensitive justice and remedy mechanisms, as well as specific 
and enhanced protection mechanisms for women human rights defenders (Feminists For 
A Binding Treaty coalition, 2017). Another area of concern is that there is no separate 
provision for ensuring access to information and participation with regard to corporate 
activities. 
 The definition of corporations is restricted, and thus does not include national 
corporations or non-profit corporations. In addition, the issue of State-owned or State-
controlled enterprises would require further elaboration. Further, since the parent 
company and its subsidiaries are construed as distinct legal entities, the parent company 
is generally not liable for wrongs committed by a subsidiary (Teitelbaum, 2010: 6). 
 The issue of extraterritorial obligations would clearly necessitate bold action on 
the part of the negotiating delegations. In its General Comment No. 24 on State 
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obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
the context of business activities, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
already accepted that the State obligation to respect, to protect and to fulfil apply both 
with respect to situations on the State’s national territory, and outside the national territory 
in situations over which States parties may exercise control. States parties’ obligations do 
not stop at their territorial borders; they are required to take the steps necessary to prevent 
human rights violations abroad by corporations domiciled in their territory and/or 
jurisdiction, without infringing the sovereignty of the host States. The rationale behind 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is that States may influence situations located outside by 
controlling the activities of corporations domiciled in their territory and/or under their 
jurisdiction (ICESCR, 2017: paras. 10, 26 and 28). It remains to be seen whether such a 
reasoning will be supported during the negotiations. Arguably, the treaty should provide 
for parent company-based regulation and access to justice for victims of transnational 
corporate human rights violations in the home State of TNCs. 
 Apart from the specific weaknesses described above, Yanes draws attention to the 
risks of human rights counter-diplomacy, i.e. the use of diplomatic means to frustrate the 
advancing of human rights issues (Yanes 2018). Thus, international legislation might be 
regarded as a failure if the number of ratifications is very low, see e.g. the 1990 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families, with 52 ratifications while the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, adopted much later, in 2006, attracted 177 ratifications; both data as of 15 
September 2018. 
 Making reservations to treaties is also a common means of excluding certain 
obligations under a given treaty. While the Zero Draft, in accordance with the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), provides that reservations incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the Convention shall not be permitted, this does not in fact act 
as a meaningful deterrent from entering into reservation contrary to the general scheme 
of the B&HR treaty. The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women of 1979 is a textbook case in this regard, with an 
extremely high number of reservations, and a great number of them touching upon the 
core obligations of the Convention. Such sweeping reservations to the envisaged B&HR 
treaty are also probable. 
 Another counter-diplomacy tactic is that States actually ratify the envisaged treaty 
but only due to external pressures or out of internal considerations, with no real intention 
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to comply with its provisions. Evidence suggests that most countries flagrantly violate 
the human rights treaties that they solemnly ratify (Posner, 2014) – a real risk in relation 
to the B&HR treaty. 
 Finally, Yanes draws attention to the tactic of “disrupting” the supervision 
mechanisms established by human rights treaties, mainly through the selection of the 
members of the monitoring bodies, on the one hand, and funding, on the other. As far as 
the former is concerned, vote-trading aims at selecting members that are less rigorous 
with certain States, while lack of funding prevents the treaty bodies from developing 
effective procedures (Komanovics, 2016). 
 By way of conclusion, the draft text represents an important milestone in 
addressing abuse of human rights by corporations. Despite its weaknesses, the standards, 
guarantees and mechanisms envisaged by draft are key elements to ensure that States do 
not compete for investment by lowering their human rights standards. 
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